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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
Firms have been struggling with financial scandals 
over the last four decades and, consequently, these 
have impacted on the level of research into the 
features and characteristics of effective corporate 
governance mechanisms. Since 1992, following the 
Cadbury Report and the OECD Report, there have 
been a rapid worldwide changes with the 
development and prominence of Corporate 
Governance Codes (CGCs) and regulations aimed at, 
amongst other things, providing a clear description 
of the main features of an effective board of 
directors (Jermias & Gani, 2014).  
The importance of the firm’s board of directors 
is based on the Agency Theory, whereby the firm’s 
shareholders appoint representatives to manage it 
on their behalf (part two of this paper provides more 
information about Agency Theory). However, Agency 
Theory leads to a separation between the firm’s 
ownership and control and creates problems such as 
conflict of interest, information asymmetry and 
moral hazard.  
As stated in the UK’s CGC (2016), the key 
features of an effective board of directors relate 
mainly to; board size, board structure and the 
separation of the duties of the Chairman and the 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on master dissertation of the first author (Alqatan, 
2017). 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO). These features include 
also, effective remuneration policy independent 
directors monitoring executive directors and 
independent board committees such as a 
remuneration committee, an audit committee and a 
nomination committee, that can provide assurances 
to the firm’s shareholders and stakeholders 
(Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2011). Furthermore, 
while not identifying the number of directors 
required forming a board of directors, the UK’s CGC 
states clearly that the board of directors should 
communicate effectively with the firm’s 
shareholders in the general meetings. 
Both issues of the separation of the Chairman’s 
and the CEO’s duties and the lack of sufficient 
independent directors have contributed to firm 
scandals such as WorldCom and Enron (Almadi, 
2016). Therefore, the current worldwide CGCs 
recognised the importance of the independent non-
executive directors as an effective mechanism in 
monitoring executive directors and ensuring an 
effective internal control system, which in result can 
mitigate agency problems. 
Consequently, in investigating the link between 
the board of directors and firm performance, this 
paper highlights the importance of such a 
mechanism.  
The main question, which this paper aims to 
answer, is whether or not there is a relationship 
between the size of the board of directors, the 
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number of independent directors and the firm’s 
performance. The objectives of this paper are as 
follows: 
 To identify the main characteristics of an 
effective board of directors;  
 To examine the relationship between board 
size and firm performance;  
 To examine the relationship between the 
independence of the board of directors and firm 
performance; and 
 To identify whether or not different 
performance measures change the impact of the 
above mentioned. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The UK CGC has been subject to continuous 
development over the years, with more attention 
being made since the financial crises in 2007. The 
importance of corporate governance can be traced 
back to Adam Smith’s (1776) book entitled "The 
Wealth Nations" and Berle and Means’s work in 
1932.  
The specific meaning of corporate governance 
depends on whether it is viewed through the Agency 
Theory or the Stakeholder Theory. Notwithstanding, 
there is general agreement about the importance of 
corporate governance in terms of whether a firm 
succeeds or fails. In this regard, several factors, such 
as increased risks due to weak control systems, 
privatization and globalization, have increased the 
importance of corporate governance and its effective 
practices (Almadi, 2016).  
Corporate governance practices can vary 
between countries depending on the nature of the 
financial market, the corporate culture, the time of 
the definition and the theory used to define such 
practices (Kaczmarek et al., 2011).  
As shown by the following, there are many 
definitions of corporate governance. The Cadbury 
Report (1992, p. 4) defined corporate governance as 
"the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled". The Dictionary of Accounting, Oxford 
University Press (1999) defined corporate 
governance as "the manner in which organisations, 
particularly limited companies are managed and the 
nature of accountability of the managers to the 
owner". Jermias and Gani (2014) defined corporate 
governance as 'the structure and function of a 
corporation in relation to its stakeholders generally, 
and its shareholders specifically".  
In addition to the firm’s functions and 
management, the Organisation for Economic 
Corporation and Development (OECD, 2004, p. 11) 
emphasizes the importance of the firm’s 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
The main features of the UK’s CGC are as 
follows:  
 Firstly, it focuses more on the spirit of the 
Code rather than its content.  
 Secondly, it encourages shareholders to 
engage more actively in monitoring the board of 
directors.  
 Thirdly, it promotes the importance of the 
board of directors being effective with particular 
regard to separating the Chairman’s and the CEO’s 
duties; maintaining a balance between executive and 
non-executive directors; rewarding good 
performance through an effective remuneration 
policy; and increasing stakeholders' confidence in 
the financial statements and the disclosure of 
information through an effective audit committee. 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory are the two 
main theories used to define corporate governance. 
The Agency Theory better explains the UK’s CGC 
and, consequently, is the basis of this paper. 
However, in order to highlight the differences 
between the two theories, the paper also discusses 
Stakeholder Theory in brief. 
Agency Theory discusses the relationship 
between the board of directors and the firm’s 
shareholders (the owners) and makes no reference to 
the firm’s stakeholders. In addition, the firm’s 
shareholders appoint the board of directors to 
manage the firm’s business on their behalf and to 
look after their interests in respect of the firm’s 
assets (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rowley, Shipilov, & 
Greve, 2017). 
Bhagat and Black’s (2002) findings highlight 
major Agency problems which include the 
separation of the firm’s ownership and control 
besides the problem of information asymmetry and 
conflict of interest. Their findings show that there is 
no association between shareholders and the firm’s 
managers, therefore, the managers are left to 
manage the firm’s business from their own 
perspective. Such a relationship leads to a conflict of 
interest. Also, in order to reduce such a risk, it is 
important that the independent directors on the 
board of directors monitor and supervise the 
managers’ work (Leung, Richardson, & Jaggi, 2014; 
Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco, 2016). Consequently, 
agency problems result in a negative association 
between board size and firm performance 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Liang, Xu, & 
Jiraporn, 2013).  
Guest’s (2009) and Yapa Abeywardhana’s 
(2016) findings show that such conflicts of interest 
can be reduced through the firm’s owners taking 
either positive and/or negative actions.  
Positive actions include incentives to the board 
of directors (financial rewards – both short- and 
long-term) and linking their interests to the 
shareholders’ interests. Also, managers can be 
rewarded with shares and, thereby, their interests 
are identical to those of the shareholders (Das, 
2019). Negative actions include a hostile takeover of 
the firm, shareholder activism, the dismissal of 
underperforming managers and shareholders 
challenging and rejecting the board of directors' 
proposals (Katsurada & Sugawara, 1998). 
According to Guest (2009) and Yapa 
Abeywardhana (2016), information asymmetry 
occurs when the managers have more private 
information about the firm than the shareholders. In 
such circumstances, the board of directors may 
manipulate the information to their benefit and, 
thereby, prevent the firm’s shareholders from 
making the correct economic decisions. 
Since it makes no reference to the firm’s 
stakeholders, Agency Theory helps to create the 
research hypothesis that evaluates the relationship 
between the board of directors and the firm’s 
shareholders. The separation of the firm’s 
ownership from its management control along with 
the problem of information asymmetry specify how 
the variables relate to one another and how they 
contribute to the firm’s performance. 
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In contrast, Stakeholder Theory suggests that 
the board of directors focuses on the interests of all 
the firm’s stakeholders not solely on the 
shareholders’ interests (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder 
Theory is based on all stakeholders contributing to 
and benefiting from the firm’s activities (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991; Jones, Harrison, & Felps, 2018). For 
instance, customers’ inputs are the cash that they 
pay when they receive their products or services. 
According to Kaczmarek et al. (2011), firms are 
expected to act beyond their legal requirements and 
obligations so that they meet the demands and 
expectations of society and other stakeholders. It 
has become imperative for a firm to adopt such a 
strategy if it wishes to maintain a competitive 
advantage. 
Accordingly, Stakeholder Theory is used to 
create a hypothesis that measures the firm’s 
performance when the board of directors focuses 
their efforts towards rewarding all stakeholders 
rather than directing their efforts solely towards 
rewarding the shareholders. This paper aims to 
determine the circumstances that enable the firm to 
maintain a competitive advantage. 
 
2.2. Board of directors and firm performance: An 
empirical discussion 
 
According to the UK CGC (2016), the board of 
directors’ main role is to provide effective 
management and leadership that make the best use 
of the firm’s human resources and financial assets. 
In addition, the UK CGC insists that the board of 
directors must be of sufficient size and that there is 
a balance between the number of non-executive and 
executive directors. 
 
2.2.1. Board size and performance 
 
Agency and Stakeholder Theories consider that the 
firm's performance is directly proportionate to the 
size of the board of directors. In this regard, Agency 
Theory states that, when controlling, monitoring and 
evaluating a firm’s business, a number of directors 
must channel their efforts towards fulfilling the 
stakeholders’ interests. This is because such 
exquisite monitoring contributes to an improvement 
in the firm’s performance (Bermig & Frick, 2010). 
In contrast, Stakeholder Theory states that the 
managers represent all stakeholders and, therefore, 
when they make the best use of their expertise, 
skills, knowledge and experience, the firm’s 
performance improves (Almadi, 2016). There were 
mixed results from several research studies that 
examined the relationship between board size and 
the board of directors’ performance (Cascio, 2004; 
Cheng, 2008; Baysinger & Butler, 1985).  
On a positive note, the findings of studies by 
such as Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990); Abidin, 
Kamal, and Jusoff (2009); Pearce and Zahra (1992); 
Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) and Tulung 
and Ramdani (2018) demonstrate a positive 
relationship between board size and firm 
performance. A large board of directors can provide 
more effective information and creative ideas which 
the firm can use to improve its performance. These 
studies’ findings recommend a higher number of 
independent non-executive directors to better 
monitor the firm and fewer agency problems such as 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest. 
While the findings of Bermig & Frick’s (2010) study 
indicate, a significant positive relationship between 
board size and TQ and, a negative association 
between board size and the return on the firm’s 
shares.  
On a negative note, by using Return on Equity 
(ROE) and Tobin's Q (TQ), Conyon and Peck’s (1998) 
findings show that a large-sized board of directors 
has a negative association with firm performance 
Jensen’s (1993) findings show that a large board of 
directors can result in ineffective firm performance 
because the CEO can easily direct the board to 
perform in his/her interests rather than those of the 
firm’s shareholders. Hermalin and Weisbach’s (2001) 
and Guest’s (2009) findings demonstrate, also, that 
too many directors on the board can have a 
detrimental effect on the amount of communication 
between them, confirming Lee and Filbeck’s (2006) 
findings of a negative association between board 
size and firm performance. In addition, findings of 
Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2002), Lin, Yang, and Sun 
(2009), Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), and Di Pietra, 
Grambovas, Raonic, and Riccaboni (2008) show no 
association between board size and firm 
performance.  
In summary, we consider that the mixed results 
of these studies are due to the lack of 
methodological rigour and the evolution of the 
board of directors’ role over the years. 
 
2.2.2. Board independence and performance 
 
According to the UK CGC (2016, p. 11), "Except for 
smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding 
the chairman, should comprise of non-executive 
directors determined by the board to be 
independent". This suggests that, in theory, 
independent non-executive directors provide an 
effective monitoring mechanism of the board of 
directors’ overall performance and that they mitigate 
the problem of conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry. In this regard, the Agency Theory states 
that there is an expectation of a positive correlation 
between board independence and firm performance. 
On a positive note, the findings of studies by 
such Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Noor and Fadzil 
(2013) show a positive correlation between board 
independence and TQ. Tulung & Ramdani’s (2018) 
findings show a positive relationship between board 
independence and ROA. Also, the findings of Kao, 
Hodgkinson, and Jaafar (2019) show a significant 
and positive relationship between independent 
directors and firm performance.  
On a negative note, Bhagat and Black’s (2002) 
findings show that higher board independence 
renders the firm less effective in increasing its value. 
Also, findings of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) 
show a negative correlation between the level of 
Research and Development (R&D) (which leads to 
better performance) and board independence.  
In addition, the findings of Weir et al. (2002), 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), and El-Faitouri (2014) 
show an insignificant association between board 
independence and firm performance.  
In summary, we consider that the mixed results 
of these studies are due to model misspecifications 
and because some studies omitted variables, such as 
managerial behaviours in the market and differences 
in institutional factors, that affected firm 
performance. 
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2.2.3. Board remuneration and performance 
 
According to the UK CGC (2016, p. 20), the agency 
theory believes that remuneration can play an 
effective role in mitigating the agency problem if it 
is linked effectively to the firm’s financial 
performance. There are also, mixed results from the 
studies on the impact of remuneration on firm 
performance. 
On a positive note and in accordance with the 
UK CGC’s recommendations, the findings of Crespi 
and Gispert (1998), Conyon and Peck (1998), Perry 
(2000), Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson III (2005) and 
Kamg, Kumar, and Lee (2006) show a positive 
correlation between executive directors’ 
remuneration and firm performance. 
On a negative note, Kostiander and Ikäheimo’s 
(2012) findings show that a negative association 
between remuneration and firm performance can 
result in an increase in managers' wealth rather than 
shareholders' wealth. This is because the board of 
directors controls the level of remuneration.  
In summary, we consider that the mixed results 
of these studies findings are due to the omission of 
important variables, such as the trends in the 
market and the differences in institutional factors 
that affect firm performance. 
 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
 
3.1. Board size and performance  
 
The existing literature supports the notion of the 
agency theory that board size can have an impact on 
the board of directors’ monitoring mechanism and, 
therefore, on the firm’s performance. A large board 
of directors can result in more talent and skills but, 
also, may reduce board communication and may run 
the risk of disagreements amongst board members. 
Thus, the first hypothesis, which we tested, is: 
H1: There is an association between board size 
and firm’s performance (ROA & Tobin’s Q). 
 
3.2. Board independence and performance 
 
The board of directors consists of two types of 
directors, namely managerial directors (executive 
directors) and non-executive directors. Both have 
their own areas of function. The board of directors 
is responsible collectively for the firm’s shareholders 
and other stakeholders.  
The Stakeholder Theory suggests that, in some 
circumstances, non-executive directors can fail to 
monitor the executive directors and can fail to 
reduce the agency problems and, in particular, those 
of information asymmetry and conflict of interest 
(Kaczmarek et al., 2011). Nevertheless, based on the 
UK CGC’s recommendation, it is clear that non-
executive directors play an important role in 
monitoring executive directors; improving their 
performance; and, therefore, increasing 
shareholders’ wealth. Hence, the second hypothesis, 
which we tested, is: 
H2: There is an association between the level of 
board independence and firm’s performance (ROA & 
Tobin’s Q). 
 
3.3. Board remuneration and performance  
 
Both the Agency Theory and the Stakeholder Theory 
support the view that board remuneration affects 
firm performance. The more remuneration the board 
members receive the greater the increase in firm 
performance. Although, based on the Agency 
Theory, previous studies’ findings show mixed 
results, we expected that paying the board directors 
more remuneration would increase the firm’s 
performance. Therefore, the third hypothesis, which 
we tested, is: 
H3: There is an association between board 
remuneration and firm’s performance (ROA & 
Tobin’s Q).  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
For this study, we used as the sample the UK FTSE 
100 non-financial companies, since a good number 
of the firms in the index operate globally, the FTSE 
100 paints a clear picture of the current economic 
events (McCann & Wheeler, 2011). We excluded 
financial firms because they differed in terms of 
how financial institutions were governed, financially 
structured, and supervised.  
The sample covers a four-year period from 
2012 to 2015 inclusive. The reason for choosing this 
period was that it would have the least effect 
following the 2008 financial crisis and would add 
value and reliability to the findings. 
We collected data about these firms from the 
Bloomberg database and, from online sources such 
as the firms’ annual reports. The data relates to 78 
firms and 312 observations and, having regard to 
previous articles by such as Tregear and Ness (2005) 
and Muzari, Kupika, Danha, and Mapingure (2013), 
this data exceeds the minimum number of 30 
observations. 
We used the collected data to measure 
accounting-based performance, market-based 
performance, the total number of directors, the ratio 
of independent directors to total board size, total 
remunerations, firm’s size and firm’s industry type. 
The following outlines and defines the main 
measures (variables) that we used in the analysis. 
Table 1 (Appendix A) summarizes the variables, 
their definitions and measures. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
For this paper, we used a multi-regression analysis 
and created the following model to test the 
hypotheses:
 
𝐹𝑃 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝑍 +  𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝐷 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑅𝑀 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑆𝑍 +  𝛽5𝐶𝐼𝐷 +  𝜀 (1) 
 
Where:  
𝐹𝑃 – Firm performance 
𝛽0 – Constant 
𝐵𝑆𝑍 – Board size 
𝐵𝐼𝐷 – Board independence 
 
𝐵𝑅𝑀 – Board remuneration 
𝐶𝑆𝑍 – Company size 
𝐶𝐼𝐷 – Company industry 
𝜀 – Error term 
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5.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
The main descriptive statistics measures, which we 
used, are the minimum, maximum, mean, and 
standard deviation. Table 2 (Appendix B) shows the 
figures generated using STATA. It shows a summary 
of the main descriptive statistics measures for the 
data. It is important to mention that these figures 
are for the average of the four years period from 
2012 to 2015. 
The total number of valid data (N) represents 
78 companies of the used sample. As shown, Table 2 
starts with ROA as performance measures. The 
mean value is 7.06 and the maximum value is 45.55 
while the minimum value is 19.02. Also, the Tobin’s 
Q mean value is 2.06 and the maximum value is 
10.41 where the minimum value is 0.66. Also, 
independent variables start with board remuneration 
with the mean value of 1400625 where the 
maximum value is 15920000 and the minimum 
value is 0.  
This means that there are firms which do not 
pay remuneration to the directors. Board size has 
the mean value of 11 directors and the maximum 
value is 20 directors and the minimum value is 6 
directors. 
The board independence mean value is 0.73; 
this means that independent directors make up 
more than half of the board’s membership. It 
indicates, also, that firms with the maximum value 
of 1.0 and the minimum value of 0.00 independent 
directors comply with the UK CGC requirement and 
act on behalf of shareholders and monitor the 
executive team closely. This means that there are 
some firms which have 100% independent board 
directors and there are firms they do not have any 
independent directors on their boards. In terms of 
firm size, the mean value is 23578. Finally, the mean 
value of the industry type is 3.346 and the maximum 
value is 7 and the minimum value is 1. This means 
that the sampled 78 firms came from 7 industry 
types.  
 
5.2. Correlation analysis  
 
As an initial step, we conducted a simple correlation 
analysis between the average values of the variables. 
Table 3 (Appendix C) presents the results of the 
correlation analysis. There are no multicollinearity 
problems because, according to Gujarati (2003) and 
Adkins, Hill, Griffiths, and Lim (2011), the highest 𝑅2 
is less than 80 percent and the larger number is the 
correlation between board remuneration and firm 
size at 63%. These results confirm that there are no 
multicollinearity problems. 
According to Table 3, the firm performance, 
measured by ROA, has a significant and negative 
correlation with firm size and industry type. On the 
other hand, firm performance, as measured by TQ, 
has also, a significant and negative correlation with 
board remuneration, board size and firm size. 
Finally, the current results are initial, however, the final 
ones will be presented in the following Section 5.3.  
 
5.3. Multi-regression results and analysis 
 
Table 4 (Appendix D) presents the outcomes 
generated from the regression test for the model 
when using ROA as the dependent variable, board 
size, board independence, and board remuneration 
as the independent variables and firm size and 
industry type as the control variable. 
As shown in Table 4, the regression results are 
similar to the results that show a significant and 
positive correlation at the 5% level between board 
remuneration and ROA. Such results support most 
of the previous studies that investigated the impact 
of remuneration on firm performance (Nahar 
Abdullah, 2006; Dogan & Smyth, 2002). 
Also, Table 4 shows a significant and positive 
correlation at the 10% level between board size and 
ROA. Generally, these results support the findings of 
Pearce and Zahra (1992), Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990), Abidin et al. (2009), Boone et 
al. (2007), and Tulung and Ramdani (2018), that 
there is a positive correlation between board size 
and ROA.  
However, Table 4 shows a significant and 
negative correlation between firm size and ROA at 
the 1% level. Similarly, the results show, also, a 
significant and negative correlation between 
industry type and ROA at the 1% level. In addition, 
board independence has no effect on ROA.  
Such a conclusion is surprising since we would 
have expected that with more independent directors 
there would have been fewer Agency Theory 
problems (information asymmetry and conflict of 
interest) and the firm’s performance would have 
been better. However, in theory, this particular 
result, suggests that with a higher number of 
independent directors, the firm loses executives who 
have the relevant experience and make a daily 
contribution to the business. The results do not 
support Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) findings that 
there is a positive correlation between board 
independence and ROA. 
Therefore, in terms of the relationship between 
the board structure and ROA, the general conclusion 
is the existence, on the one hand, of a significant 
and positive association between board 
remuneration and board size and ROA and, on the 
other hand, a significant and negative association 
between firm size, company type and ROA. 
Table 5 (Appendix E) presents the outcomes 
generated from the model’s regression test when 
using TQ as the dependent variable, board size, 
board independence, and board remuneration as the 
independent variables and firm size and industry 
type as the control variables. 
Table 5 shows, also, a significant and positive 
correlation at the 5% level between board 
independence and TQ because, as expected, with 
more independent directors, there is less of an 
Agency Theory problem and, consequently, the 
firm’s performance improves. These results support 
most of the previous empirical studies which 
concluded that there was a positive association 
between board independence and firm performance 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; and Noor & Fadzil, 2013).  
These results indicate the importance of 
independent directors as the internal monitors of 
the firm’s executive directors since they can be 
highly effective and can reduce the Agency Theory 
problems of information asymmetry and conflict of 
interest. 
Also, surprisingly, Table 5 shows that board 
size has no effect on TQ. However, when considering 
the statistical significance of each variable, this 
reveals that there is no statistical significance that 
can support these correlations. Therefore, we 
conclude from this analysis that there is an 
insignificant positive relationship between board 
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size and TQ. However, there is a significant and 
positive relationship at the 1% level between 
remuneration and TQ.  
When compared with previous empirical 
studies, this study’s results support the findings of 
Jiraporn et al. (2005) and Kamg et al. (2006) who 
concluded that there was a significant and positive 
relationship between board remuneration and TQ 
and long-term investments. To some extent, it can 
be noted that the positive correlation between 
remuneration and TQ means that board 
remuneration influences firm performance. Namely, 
the more remuneration leads to an increase in firm 
performance which will reduce the Agency Theory 
problems of both information asymmetry and 
conflict of interest.  
However, the results show a significant and 
negative correlation between firm size and Tobin's Q 
at a level of less than 1% significance. This suggests 
that, in terms of TQ, large firms tend to perform less 
than smaller firms.  
Finally, Table 5 shows a significant and 
negative correlation at the 1% level of significance 
between industry type and TQ. 
Therefore, in terms of the relationship between 
the board of directors and TQ, the general 
conclusion is the existence, on the one hand, of a 
significant and positive association between board 
independence and TQ and, on the other hand, a 
significant and positive association between board 
remuneration and TQ. 
However, there is a significant and negative 
association between firm size, industry type and TQ. 
Accordingly, the figures of the analysis, shown in 
Tables 4 and 5, are similar to the outcomes 
generated in the previous model.  
Therefore, having tested the hypotheses, the 
regression analysis results accept hypothesis “H1” 
that there is an association between board size and 
firm’s performance (ROA). However, the regression 
analysis results reject the hypothesis “H1” that there 
is an association between board size and firm’s 
performance (TQ). Also, the regression analysis 
results reject the hypothesis “H2” that there is an 
association between board independence and firm’s 
performance (ROA). However, the regression analysis 
results accept hypothesis “H2” that there is an 
association between board independence and ROA. 
Finally, the regression analysis results accept 
hypothesis “H3” that, in terms of both ROA and TQ, 
there is an association between board remuneration 
and firm’s performance. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Following the financial scandals and struggles faced 
by firms in the past decades, this paper aimed to 
investigate effective corporate governance with 
regard to the characteristics of the board of 
directors, and, in particular, board structure in 
terms of size, independence and remuneration. 
Part 1 of this paper sets out we used a quantitative 
study, based on secondary data, in which ROA and 
TQ were the two main performance measures.  
In this regard, we reviewed extensive literature 
on recent empirical and theoretical studies relevant 
to Corporate Governance and corporate 
performance. Then, we identified and developed the 
hypotheses, analysed the collected data and the 
results of the regression analysis, and finally, we 
arrived at conclusions. The theoretical framework of 
corporate governance and the importance of the 
board of directors depends largely and relates to the 
current and previous practices provided and 
recommended by the UK’s CGC. Regardless of their 
size and industry, the board of directors plays a 
critical role in whether or not firms are successful. 
Such importance highlights the necessity of an 
effective board of directors. The UK CGC 
recommends a balanced board with balanced 
numbers of executive and non-executive directors, 
with clear segregation of duties existing between the 
Chairman and the CEO Chief Executive Officer, and 
where remuneration policy is effective and linked to 
the firm’s financial performance. 
With regard to the empirical studies, there are 
no clear conclusions on the relationship between 
board size and firm performance because there is no 
agreement on the impact that large boards have on 
firm performance. Some studies concluded that 
there was a positive relationship between board size 
and firm performance and a large board of directors 
would produce more ideas and have expertise and 
experience which could enrich the quality of 
decision making and effective investments. 
Other studies concluded there was a negative 
relationship between board size and performance 
and supported the theoretical debate that a large 
board of directors could increase the ineffectiveness 
of communication between the board members and 
could lead to a higher risk of disagreement between 
them which might make the board’s performance 
less effective.  
Studies on the importance of independent non-
executive directors in reducing the Agency Theory 
problems provided mixed results and conclusions 
and there were no unified suggestions. Similarly, 
there were disagreements about the impact of board 
remuneration on board performance.  
It is necessary to mention that the inconsistent 
conclusions between these studies depended largely 
on the used performance measure, methods of 
analysis, the time period and sample used in the 
analysis. 
This paper’s findings show a significant 
positive correlation between Board size and ROA. 
These are slightly different results when using TQ as 
a performance measure. In this respect, there is a 
significant positive correlation between board 
independence and board remuneration and TQ. 
Similarly, in terms of both ROA and TQ, there is a 
significant negative correlation between firm size 
and company type. 
 
6.1. Recommendations for further research 
 
This paper proposes areas of potential future 
research. These studies should not be restricted to a 
period of three years because the findings are likely 
to be different if the samples cover a longer period 
of time. Future studies should make use of the 
qualitative aspects of the board of directors. The 
research should focus on the directors’ functions 
and not only on their numbers. In order to 
determine exactly the degree to which the board size 
and structure influences firm performance, the 
dummy variable for all the board sizes should be 
added when assessing the relationship between firm 
performance and board size. Future research can 
conduct more advanced analysis such as year-to-year 
analyses in order to identify whether or not changes 
occur between the periods. Future studies should 
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use, also, both quantitative and qualitative measures 
to assist in the evaluation of the firm’s 
performances. In addition, future studies should 
examine more variables relating to board 
characteristics. This will reduce the research gap by 
improving on this paper’s limitations on the impact 
of board structure on firm performance. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table 1. Variables 
 
Variable Symbol Measurements 
Independent variables 
Board size BSZ Total number of directors on the board 
Board independence BID 
The proportion of independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board 
Board remuneration BRM Total remuneration paid to all board directors (executive) “Long-term pay” 
Control variables 
Company size CSZ Total assets 
Company industry CID The industry type in which the company is listed 
Dependent variables 
Accounting-based measure ROA Return on assets 
Market-based measure TQ Tobin’s Q 
 
Hence, based on the above symbols, the regression model can now be presented as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝐵𝑆𝑍 +  𝐵𝐼𝐷 +  𝐵𝑅𝑀 +  𝐶𝑆𝑍 +  𝐶𝐼𝐷 (2) 
 
𝑇𝑄 =  𝐵𝑆𝑍 +  𝐵𝐼𝐷 +  𝐵𝑅𝑀 +  𝐶𝑆𝑍 +  𝐶𝐼𝐷 (3) 
  
Appendix B 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all firms (N. 312) 
 
Variables Count Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 304 7.06 7.50 -19.02 45.55 
TQ 292 2.06 1.17 0.66 10.41 
BRM 298 1400625 1968740 0 15920000 
BSZ 298 11 2 6 20 
BID 298 0.73 0.12 0.00 1.00 
CSZ 307 23578 43768 111 230865 
CID 312 3.346 1.578 1 7 
Note: BRM is board remuneration, BSZ is board size, the BID is Board independence, CSZ is company size, CID is Industry type, 
ROA is Return on Assets, and TQ is Tobin's Q 
 
Appendix C 
 
Table 2. Matrix of correlations 
 
Variables ROA TQ BRM Log BSZ BID Log CSZ CID 
ROA 1 
      
TQ 0.6780* 1 
     
Log BRM -0.1107 -0.1301* 1 
    
Log BSZ -0.0408 -0.1310* 0.4827* 1 
   
BID -0.03 0.0553 0.3593* 0.3216* 1 
  
Log CSZ -0.3823* -0.5682* 0.6305* 0.4730* 0.2571* 1 
 
CID -0.1297* -0.0871 -0.2341* -0.1274* -0.1236* -0.1476 1 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: BRM is board remuneration, BSZ is board size, the BID is Board independence, CSZ is company size, CID is Industry type, 
ROA is Return on Assets, and TQ is Tobin's Q 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 4. Regression analysis outcome using ROA as the dependent variable (linear regression) 
 
ROA Coef. St. Err t-value p-value Sig. 
Rem 1.637 0.664 2.46 0.014 ** 
LogBS 3.822 2.089 1.83 0.068 * 
nonexe -1.654 3.490 -0.47 0.636  
Logsize -3.073 0.357 -8.62 0.000 *** 
Industrytype -0.847 0.243 -3.49 0.001 *** 
_cons 7.821 7.540 1.04 0.300  
 
Mean dependent var 7.255 SD dependent var 7.244 
R-squared 0.237 Number of obs 292.000 
F-test 17.792 Prob > F 0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 1917.035 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 1939.096 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Appendix E 
 
Table 5. Regression analysis outcome using TQ as the dependent variable (linear regression) 
 
TQ Coef. St. Err t-value p-value Sig. 
Log BRM 0.441 0.091 4.84 0.000 *** 
Log BSZ 0.434 0.291 1.49 0.137  
BID 1.240 0.488 2.54 0.012 ** 
Log CSZ -0.711 0.049 -14.56 0.000 *** 
CID -0.104 0.033 -3.14 0.002 *** 
_cons 0.908 1.035 0.88 0.381  
 
Mean dependent var 2.071 SD dependent var 1.175 
R-squared 0.459 Number of obs 287.000 
F-test 47.667 Prob > F 0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 741.553 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 763.510 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
 
